tive weights showed that valence effects occurred when participants heavily weighted desirable features sisted of extremely favorable and extremely unfavorin preferred options and undesirable features in less able features. Shafir's participants designated the expreferred options. These patterns of subjective treme option when they were required to choose one weighting for positive and negative valence effects out of two, but the same option was rejected when partiwere consistent with the focus shift model. Data were cipants were required to assume the two in possession more consistent with the focus shift model over alter-and disown either one. Research on similarity judgnative explanations of valence effects. Relationship ment provides another well-known example. Tversky's with relevant economic and psychological phenomena (1977) participants rated North Korea as more similar are discussed. ᭧ 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
to China than China was to North Korea.
To explain such asymmetries, some theorists adopted The judgmental literature has repeatedly shown that the notion of feature-decomposition of objects of judglogically equivalent magnitude judgments may differ ment, and task-dependent subjective weighting upon such features. In Tversky's case, the objects were decomThis work is based on the author's doctoral dissertation submitted to University of Washington. I thank John Miyamoto (advisory composed into sets of shared and unique features. Similarity mittee chair), Richard Gonzalez, Earl Hunt, Elizabeth Loftus, and judgment is reached by assigning subjective weights to Deborah McCutchen for their encouragement, guidance, and criti-the feature sets, and by combining the weighted contribucism throughout my graduate career. The helpful suggestions from tion of each feature to the judgment. The asymmetry two anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged. My appreciaarises when the subjective weighting to features that are tion extends to Laura Kray and Julie Feldman for their comments on an earlier draft. A preliminary report of this research was preunique to each object differs between judgments of ''How sented at the 34th annual meeting of The Psychonomic Society. Adsimilar is A to Z?'' and ''How similar is Z to A?'' In preferdress correspondence and reprint requests to Kimihiko Yamagishi, ence reversals (Shafir, Osherson, & Smith, 1989 ; TverFaculty of Business and Environment, Shukutoku University, Fujisky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988; Tversky, Slovic, & Kahne- kubo 1150-1, Miyoshi-Cho, Iruma-Gun, Saitama 354, Japan. E-mail: kimihiko@shukutoku.ac.jp or PAG00457@niftyserve.or.jp. man, 1990) , the payoff and probability of each gamble 290 0749-5978/96 $18.00 Copyright ᭧ 1996 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
constitute the features in choice options. The preference comparison, each school has relevant features that confor a higher-probability gamble in binary choice is ex-tribute to judgment of the quality of education. It could plained by decision makers assigning heavier subjective be assumed that the contribution for the positive imweights to probabilities, whereas the higher price for the pacts (e.g., quality of education) would be stronger at high-payoff gamble in bidding (which implies a reversal the First Choice. In answering the ''How much better of preferential order) is explained by participants as-at the First Choice'' question, subjective weights would signing heavier subjective weights to payoffs. In the be more heavily assigned to the First Choice, because choice-rejection asymmetry (Shafir, 1993) , subjective it is the subject of comparison in the particular question weights are assigned to sets of desirable and undesirable phrase. Judgments reached by such a procedure result features in choice options. In choice, decision makers as-in assigning stronger subjective weights to features sign heavier weights to desirable features, thereby the with stronger contributions. In contrast, in answering option with extremely desirable features is chosen. Con-the ''How much worse at the Second Choice'' questions, versely, in rejection, decision makers assign heavier the subject of comparison now switches to the Second weights to undesirable features, thereby the option with Choice. Heavier subjective weights would be assigned extremely undesirable features is disowned.
to the Second Choice. Hence, relatively weaker weights This paper extends this line of research in the follow-are assigned to features with the stronger contribution ing sense. I introduce asymmetries in comparative dif-in the First Choice, whereas stronger weights are asference judgments, and theories on such asymmetries signed to features with lesser contributions at the Secbased on feature-weighting approach. The review indi-ond Choice. The Dunning-Parpal asymmetry occurs cates the phenomenon of interest in this paper, namely because, by the mental addition, subjective weighting an asymmetry in strength-of-preference judgments. stretches the differences in feature contributions between the superior and inferior options of choice,
MENTAL ADDITION AND SUBTRACTION
whereas by the mental subtraction, the subjective (DUNNING & PARPAL, 1989) weights are assigned such that, when the feature contributions are summed up to reach a judgment, the Dunning and Parpal noted an asymmetry in compar-heavy weighting of the inferior option decreases the ative judgments that involved counterfactual reason-gap between the differences between the superior and ing. They asked undergraduates at their first choice inferior options in their feature contributions. For excollege to compare their college and the other second ample, suppose that the qualities of education at the choice college that they would have attended if the first First and the Second choice are 8 and 6, respectively. choice rejected their application (the first choice and Suppose further that the weights for the subject of comthe second choice were clearly recognized by each parparison and the alternative choice option are 2 and ticipant). One group of participants was asked to rate 1, respectively. Assuming a process of weighted linear how much more challenging their classes at First combination, the mental addition would produce a difChoice College are than they would have been at Secferent judgment of 8 1 2 0 6 1 1 Å 10. In turn, the ond Choice College. The other group was asked to rate mental subtraction would produce a difference of 6 1 how much less challenging their courses would have 2 0 8 1 1 Å 4. Thus, mental addition exceeds mental been at Second Choice than they are at First Choice.
subtraction. The magnitude judgments in this comparison showed
The Dunning-Parpal asymmetry inspired subsethat the former (M Å 6.0) was reliably greater than the quent research. Dhar and Simonson (1992) applied the latter (M Å 3.4). Their numerous replications showed idea of subjective-weight shifts among the subjects of that judgments of How much more produced greater comparisons to analyze consumer preferences. Busimagnitudes than judgments of How much less. The ness major students were asked to assume that they Dunning-Parpal asymmetry was discovered in this had been admitted to business schools at Harvard and sense.
Stanford and to express their preference. Prior to indiDunning and Parpal explained their findings by cating their choice, one group of participants was rewhat they termed Mental Addition and Subtraction.
quired to compare the schools in terms of how much The mental addition was defined as ''assessments in more attractive Harvard was and how much they prewhich people must determine whether a causal agent ferred Harvard more. The response scale was positive will produce an outcome to a greater degree'' (Dunin favor of Harvard (positive numbers if Harvard was ning & Parpal, 1989, p. 5). The mental subtraction was more attractive/preferable) and negative in disfavor of defined by replacing the word ''greater'' with ''lesser.'' Harvard (negative numbers if Harvard was less attracSpecifically, they adopted the notions of feature-decomtive/preferable). The other group was required to composition and task-dependent changes in subjective weights. In the First Choice vis-à -vis Second Choice pare the same schools, yet the subject of comparison
Subscripts s and i stand for superiority and inferiority, respectively. D represents difference judgment, and a, b, g, and h denote the subjective weighting that are associated with corresponding feature sets. f(r) represents the contribution of each feature set to the judgment. It follows from Formulas (1) and (2) that a positive valence effect is observed when
focus shift model. and a negative valence effect is observed when D s õ was changed to Stanford. Each group rated the subject-D i , iff of-comparison school more favorably, and, in each group, the majority of participants preferred that (
school. Dhar and Simonson argued that the subject of
(4) comparison attracted heavier subjective weighting, and the weighting influenced decision makers' articulaNote that Formulas (3) and (4) postulate that position of preferential orders.
tive and negative valence effects occur when subjective weighting changes as a function of valence of the ques-
VALENCE EFFECTS AND FOCUS SHIFT MODEL
tion. The label, ''focus shift,'' reflects the idea of such , 1996) weighting changes. Yamagishi and Miyamoto used hypothetical gamble pairs that varied in payoffs, and one As in Dhar and Simonson, the Dunning-Parpal asymmetry led Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996) to in-gamble (Option A) always dominated the other (Option Z). They found that, for gambles that consisted of payvestigate a similar asymmetry. Yamagishi and Miyamoto found that judgments of ''How much better is a offs of winning and losing outcomes, participants were equally likely to produce positive and negative valence preferred option?'' and ''How much worse is a less preferred option?'' may differ in their magnitudes. They effects (i.e., a group of participants systematically produced positive valence effects, whereas another group called the former and the latter types of judgment as superiority judgment and inferiority judgment, respec-systematically produced negative valence effects). They used regression analysis to estimate the subjective tively. They called it a positive valence effect when a superiority judgment exceeds an inferiority judgment weighting parameters for each participant. For each subjective weight, they calculated the difference befor an identical pair of options, and a negative valence effect for the difference in the opposite direction. To tween superiority and inferiority judgments (e.g., for
A good , they calculated a s 0 a i ). For the participants who analyze the cognitive process that produced such asymmetries, Yamagishi and Miyamoto proposed a focus produced positive valence effects, the differences of subjective weights followed the pattern of boxplots in shift model. Like many feature-weighting models, the focus shift model is built upon feature-decomposition the top panel of Fig. 2 . The top panel of Fig. 2 shows that positive valence effects were associated with the of choice options, and task-dependent subjective weighting plays a central role to explain positive and a and h differences that were greater than zero, whereas the b and g differences were closer to zero. The negative valence effects.
The focus shift model applies to comparative judg-middle panel of Fig. 2 shows the pattern of estimated differences in subjective weights for the group of partiments between Options A and Z, where A is preferred to Z. These Options are represented as unique sets of cipants who produced reliable negative valence effects (the distinction between the black versus dotted boxes, features, and the features are either desirable or undesirable. Figure 1 shows the set representation and ter-as well as the interpretation of the bottom panel of Fig. 2, will be explained in relation with the hypothesis of minology for the feature sets in the focus shift model. The focus shift model represents superiority and in-Experiment 2). The top and the middle panels show mirror images of each other, along the zero line. From feriority judgments by Formulas (1) and (2), respectively:
these results, Yamagishi and Miyamoto argued that it cancer). When choice options were sampled from pleasant domains, the mean superiority and inferiority ratings exhibited positive valence effects. Conversely, when choice options were chosen from unpleasant domains, participants exhibited reliable negative valence effects. For instance, in a choice between vacation plans, the mean superiority and inferiority ratings were 10.48 and 7.42, respectively. In a choice between painful treatments for cancer, the mean superiority and inferiority ratings were 9.33 and 10.60, respectively.
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER
This paper extends the line of research set forth by Yamagishi and Miyamoto by investigating two psychological issues that remain to be explored. First, although Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996) showed that the directions of valence effects varied depending on the intrinsic pleasantness of the stimulus domains, the patterns of subjective weighting under such conditions remain to be uncovered. Second, the focus shift model will be compared to a class of other plausible models to examine their empirical agreement with data. The following experiments investigate these issues.
Experiment 1 aimed at replicating the results from Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996) using stimuli chosen from a semantically simpler domain, i.e., gambles. Experiment 2 was designed to estimate the subjective weighting parameters under systematic positive and negative valence effects to verify whether the
FIG. 2.
Subjective weighing patterns observed in a previous study (top and middle panels, Yamagishi & Miyamoto, 1996) and weighting pattern is consistent with the prediction depredicted for Experiment 2 (bottom).
rived from the results from Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996) . Experiment 3 contrasts the focus shift model and other plausible models that may explain valence was subjective weights on A good and Z bad that produced effects. These rival models were compared with respect systematic valence effects. The participants with heavy to an empirical relationship among choice options that subjective weights on these feature sets in superiority must hold if the alternative models were in effect. judgments (i.e., a s and h s were great) produced the a and h differences scattering above the zero line, and
EXPERIMENT 1
Formula (3) tends to hold from this weighting pattern. In contrast, the participants with heavy subjective
The purpose of Experiment 1 is to examine whether the pattern of valence effects in intrinsically pleasant weights on A good and Z bad in inferiority judgments (i.e., a i and h i were great) produced the a and h differences versus unpleasant domains with complex stimuli (Yamagishi & Miyamoto, 1996) is also obtained using monscattering below zero, and Formula (4) tends to hold. The b and g differences scatter along the zero line, etary gambles. Hypothetical gambles with either exclusively winning payoffs or exclusively losing payoffs suggesting little focus shift concerning these two feature sets (A bad and Z good ).
were used as stimuli. These two sets of gambles represent a pleasant and unpleasant domain, respectively. Moreover, Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996) documented that the directions of valence effects at the ag-It is predicted that positive valence effects occur with exclusively winning gambles, whereas negative vagregate level were predictable from the intrinsic pleasantness of the stimulus domain. In another experi-lence effects occur with exclusively losing gambles. The rationale for using gambles is as follows: Gambles with ment, they sampled choice options from intrinsically pleasant domains (e.g., vacation plans) and from intrin-either exclusively winning or exclusively losing payoffs leave little variability for individual differences in the sically unpleasant domains (e.g., painful treatments for interpretation of choice options as desirable or undesir-gamble presentation, as well as answering ''Better'' and ''Worse'' questions, were randomized and counable. In addition, gambles with explicitly stated payoff and probability have been used as the standard choice terbalanced across participants. alternatives in decision making research (for a review, see Slovic, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1988) .
Results and Discussion

1
Method
All participants preferred the dominant option at every opportunity for choice (the same tendency was obParticipants. Participants were 187 University of served in Experiments 2 and 3, thus will not be menWashington undergraduates. They were enrolled in an tioned repeatedly hereafter). For each gamble pair, I introductory psychology course and participated to performed a 2 by 2 ANOVA (domain by valence) to earn extra credit.
estimate the error term (MS e ) for two orthogonal planned comparisons. The [1 01 0 0] contrast, denoting Variables. Two independent variables were used.
the contrast values for the superiority-gain, inferiorityOne was the domain of choice options, consisting of gain, superiority-loss, and inferiority-loss conditions, gain and loss conditions. These conditions were repretested for positive valence effects in the gain condition. sented by exclusively winning and exclusively losing Likewise, the [0 0 1 01] contrast tested the negative gambles, respectively. Another independent variable valence effects in the loss condition. The MS e s for Gamwas valence of judgment (either superiority or inferiorbles 1 through 4 were 6.64, 5.98, 8.44, and 7.13, respecity). The dependent variables were superiority and intively (df Å 185). Table 1 shows the mean superiority feriority rating on a 16-point scale that ranged from 0 and inferiority judgments for the gain and loss condi-(no difference) to 15 (maximum difference).
tions. The t values in the gain and loss conditions were Stimuli. Appendix A shows the pairs of gambles calculated by subtracting the mean inferiority judgused in Experiment 1. In each stimulus pair, the pay-ment from the mean superiority judgment. Therefore, offs of Option A were set to be higher than those of a positive t value indicates a positive valence effect, Option Z, to maintain the relation that A was always whereas a negative t value indicates a negative valence preferable to Z. Exclusively losing gambles were gener-effect. ated by changing payoffs from ''Win'' to ''Lose.'' Table 1 shows empirical supports for the prediction. In the gain condition, reliable positive valence effects Design and prediction. A mixed design was used.
were found for all gamble pairs. Conversely, in the loss The domain was a between-subject variable; 94 particicondition, the direction of valence effects was all relipants were assigned to the gain condition and 93 partiably negative. It may be concluded that Experiment cipants were assigned to the loss condition. The valence 1 replicated the findings of Yamagishi and Miyamoto was a within-subject variable. It was predicted that (1996), using hypothetical gambles as choice options. positive valence effects would be observed in the gain condition, whereas negative valence effects would be observed in the loss condition.
EXPERIMENT 2
Procedure. All the experiments reported in this
Although the results from Experiment 1 were consispaper followed the procedure outlined here, except tent with Yamagishi and Miyamoto's (1996) findings, for minor differences (such as the amount of payoffs) the results alone do not necessarily indicate whether that are introduced whenever necessary. Data were focus shift occurred when positive and negative valence gathered in group settings. Each participant was effects were observed. Therefore, it is desirable to estigiven a booklet of gamble choices that contained mate subjective weight parameters (a s , a i , b s , b i , g s , other filler tasks. Participants were instructed that g i , h s , and h i ) to confirm that they do change as a functhey could choose either Gamble A or Z, and the outtion of valence, and that the pattern of weight change come was determined by flipping a fair coin (i.e., a is consistent with the logic of the focus shift model. 50-50 chance between Heads and Tails). The gambles Experiment 2 was designed to estimate subjective were hypothetical and no actual monetary transacweighting parameters under positive valence effects in tions occurred in the experiment. For each gamble pleasant domains and negative valence effects in unpair, participants were first asked to express their pleasant domains. preferences. Subsequently, they evaluated the gamble in terms of ''How much better is the option that you chose than the option that you did not choose?'' Prediction for the Subjective Weighting Pattern for subjective weighing in the domain of losses, as represented by the black boxes. In such cases, the Given the results from Experiment 1, it would be focus shift model for negative valence effects in Forreasonable to predict that positive valence effects mula (4) reduces to Formula (6) by presuming that would be observed in intrinsically pleasant domains. f (A good ) É f (Z good ) É 0, From the subjective weighting pattern noted by Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996) , the ʜ-shaped pattern 
) experiments, the intrinsic pleasantness of their stimuli was unclear a priori. Therefore, the focus shift Again, if one assumes that f(Z bad ) ú f(A bad ), the inmodel consisted of four feature subsets, A good , A bad , equality in Formula (6) follows from the pattern in the Z good , and Z bad . In turn, when the focus shift model black boxplot (the h difference is very negative comis applied to intrinsically pleasant domains, it could pared to the b difference). be assumed that the sets of undesirable features conConsidering only the black boxes from the top and tribute very little to judgments. Therefore, eliminat-middle panels of Fig. 2 , the bottom panel shows the ing the A bad and Z bad boxes from the top panel of Fig. predicted patterns of subjective weights for the do-2 leaves the black boxes as the predicted subjective mains of gains and losses. The a difference tends to be weighting pattern for pleasant domains. Formally, very positive, whereas the h difference tends to be very positive valence effects were described by Formula negative. The b and g differences are predicted to scat-(3). Assuming that the contributions of A bad and Z bad ter around the zero line. are negligible in pleasant domains (i.e., f (A bad ) É f (Z bad ) É 0), deletion of these terms leave the followTesting for the Necessity of the Weight Parameters ing reduced focus shift model to describe positive valence effects in the domain of gains:
As discussed above, the explanation of valence effect using the focus shift model requires eight pa-
Having to allow for the eight parameters may seem
lacking in parsimony and elegance. One way to evaluate the necessity of these parameters in explaining If f(A good ) ú f(Z good ) is assumed, the inequality in Forthe phenomenon would be to generate models that mula (5) follows from the pattern in the black boxplot constrain some of the parameters to be equal, and (the a difference is very positive and greater than the compare the fits between the focus shift model and g difference).
such other models. Conversely, in intrinsically unpleasant domains, Recall that the focus shift model reduced for intrinsinegative valence effects would be predicted, given the cally pleasant domains is: observation in Experiment 1. Moreover, Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996) 
Likewise, in intrinsically unpleasant domains, the reduced model is:
for the domains of gains and losses, respectively.
The top and the bottom panels in Fig. 3 show a scheme of the hierarchical relationship among these and models, for the domains of gains and losses, respectively. Implications among the models are indicated
(10) by arrows in the hierarchy. One of the purposes in Experiment 2 was to fit the models in Formulas (7) The first constraint I propose is to inhibit the focus through (18) for each participant's responses to comshift to occur, namely to constrain the weights for supepare the goodness of fit among such models. riority and inferiority judgments to be equal. Formulas
As in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 also used hypo-(11) and (12) represent such models for desirable and thetical gambles. A major difference from Experiment undesirable domains, respectively. 1 lies in a factorial design with more levels in the payoffs in dominating and dominated gambles, and in the Dr Å arf(A good ) 0 grf(Z good ) (11) use of a completely within-subject design. Such a setting enabled to examine the directions of valence effects and and to estimate subjective weight parameters for each participant.
Method where the constraints are that
Participants. Thirty-one University of Washington Å ar, and similarly for b, g, and h.
undergraduates participated to earn extra credit for an Another constraint would be to force the subjective introductory psychology course. weights for the preferred and less preferred options to be equal. Thus, Formulas (7) and (8) would be rewritten as:
Design. A within-subject design was used. Independent variables were domain (gains or losses), valence
(13) (superiority or inferiority), and amount of payoffs in dominating and dominated options (4 by 4). Dependent and variables were judgments of superiority and inferiority on a 16-point scale ranging from 0 (no difference) to 15 (maximum difference).
Stimuli. Hypothetical two-outcome gambles were Likewise, Formulas (9) and (10) would be rewritten as: used as stimuli, which are listed in Appendix B. Let Sets A and Z denote sets of exclusively winning gambles (gain condition), where each element in Set A dom-
inates each element in Set Z. Set A consisted of Gambles {b, c, d, e} and Set Z consisted of gambles {v, w, x, y}. and In contrast, let Sets A and Z denote sets of exclusively losing gambles (loss condition). Stimuli in the loss con-
(16) dition were generated by changing the payoffs from Sets A and Z from winning to losing. Set A consisted The models in Formulas (13) through (16) assume that of Gambles {b, c, d, e} and Set Z consisted of Gama s Å g s Å k s , a i Å g i Å k i , and similarly for b, h, and l.
bles {v, w, x, y}. Again, every element in Set A domiLastly, the final constraint requires that the weights nated every element in Set Z. for the preferred and less preferred option, as well as superiority and inferiority ratings, be equal. Thus, imProcedure. The whole experiment consisted of two posing to Formulas (11) and (12) that ar Å gr Å p and sessions. Each session consisted of two blocks. Between br Å hr Å u, one obtains, sessions, there was a 1-week interval. Each participant was randomly presented with either gain or loss condition at each session, and the order of the domain was participant was presented with either gain or loss con-Results and Discussion dition across the blocks. The orders of gamble presentaFor each participant's responses on each stimulus tion and providing superiority and inferiority ratings pair, the mean rating was calculated between the two were randomized and counterbalanced across participants.
blocks. Therefore, 16 mean superiority ratings and 16 (7) through (10) and (13) through (16) 
, a linear regression model was fitted to 16 data points separately for the superiority and inferiority ratings. In contrast, the models in mean inferiority ratings were obtained from every parFormula (11), (12), (17), and (18) do not distinguish ticipant. Subsequent analyses were all applied on these superiority and inferiority ratings. Thus, these models mean ratings.
were fitted to 32 data points collapsing over the superiValence effects at aggregate level. For each gamble ority and inferiority ratings. For each data point, the pair, the mean superiority and inferiority rating aver-corresponding payoffs for ''Heads'' for gambles from Set aging across participants were calculated separately A and Z were used as the values of f(r). The payoffs for for the gain and the loss conditions. The mean differ-''Tails'' were not incorporated in this procedure because ence was tested by a paired t test. Hereafter, as a nota-they were perfectly correlated with the payoffs for tion, pairs of options are presented in brackets. For Heads. Because these models differ in their degrees of instance, a [b y] pair consists of Option b from Set freedoms that contributed to estimate the subjective A and Option y from Set Z. Table 2 shows the mean weights parameters, adjusted R 2 was used as a measuperiority and inferiority ratings, as well as t test sta-sure of comparison among these models. tistics (df Å 30) in the gain condition. For all gamble pairs, reliable positive valence effects were observed. In the gain condition, 30 participants produced positive by the models of judgments in the domain of losses. Again, the models that allow b s , b i , h s , and h i to vary (Formulas (9) and (10)) achieve better fitting over other models that constrain these parameters. Friedman's statistic rejected the null hypothesis that the adjusted R 2 s differ by chance alone, x 2 r Å 111.50***, df Å 5. Thus, it may be argued that having the eight parameters for the focus shift model (Formulas (7) through (10)) achieves descriptive advantage over other models that allow for fewer parameters.
Estimating subjective weighting parameters. To estimate a s and g s , Formula (7) was fitted to each participant's superiority ratings in the gain condition. Likewise, to estimate a i and g i , Formula (8) was fitted to the inferiority ratings in the gain condition. To estimate b s , h s , and b i , h i , Formulas (9) and (10) were fitted to the superiority and inferiority ratings, respectively, in the loss condition. Finally, the difference between each feature set's subjective weights was estimated by subtracting the weight estimate for the superiority ratings from the estimate for the inferiority ratings. Figure 5 shows notched boxplots of the estimated differences of the subjective weights. Notice the resemblance of the predicted pattern in the bottom panel of Fig. 2 . In the gain condition, the 95% confidence intervals for the a differences lie above the zero line. However, the g differences scatter around the zero line, (Table 2 ). In contrast, the 95% confidence intervals for (McGill, Tukey, & Larsen, 1978) of the adjusted R 2 s the b and h differences lie below the zero line, with the for each participant's responses, fitted by the models h differences scattered further away. This pattern is of judgments in the domain of gains. Note that the R 2 s obtained using the same data that showed systematic are highest for Formula (7), followed by Formula (8).
negative valence effects (Table 3) . Thus, Fig. 5 shows Other models that impose constraints on a s , a i , g s , and g i did not produce comparable fits, as shown by the boxplots for Formulas (11), (13), (14), and (17). Friedman's statistic was calculated to test the null hypothesis that the adjusted R 2 s among the models differ due to chance alone. 3 The null hypothesis was rejected, x 2 r Å 123.63***, df Å 5. The bottom panel of Fig. 4 shows notched boxplots of adjusted R 2 for each participant's responses, fitted 2 In notched boxplots, the top and bottom ends of ''whiskers'' extend to the maximum and minimum observations excluding outliers. Outliers appear as open circles and asterisks. The upper and lower ends of the box represent the 75th and 25th percentiles, whereas the horizontal bar inside the box denotes the median. The notches that extend from the median indicate the 95% confidence bounds for the median.
3 Friedman's nonparametric test was used because the pattern in Fig. 4 that the subjective weighting parameters confirmed the prediction that followed from Yamagishi and Miyamoto's (1996) results, and were consistent with the description of positive and negative valence effects by the reduced focus shift models (Formulas (5) and (6)).
EXPERIMENT 3
The purpose of Experiment 3 is to compare the focus   FIG. 6 . Hypothetical examples of adherence to (left) and violation shift model to other alternative explanations that could of (right) OI. explain valence effects by their agreement with data. The following section specifies a condition under which such alternative accounts and the focus shift model superiority judgments should be the same as the orderlead to different predictions. Experiment 3 was specifi-ing in inferiority judgments. cally designed to compare these rival models under
The left panel of Fig. 6 shows an illustration of a such a condition. To illustrate the condition, the logic hypothetical result that adheres to OI. Suppose that of the alternative models is discussed first.
one obtains superiority and inferiority ratings of a set of options, rank-orders them by the superiority ratings, Alternative models of valence effects.
First, let the and plots them. Furthermore, assume that, for each following notation hold: Suppose that Option i is preoption, the corresponding inferiority ratings were overferred to Option p; Option j is preferred to Option q; laid on the plot of the superiority ratings. The left panel and f(r) represents a value function for such options.
shows that both superiority and inferiority ratings An alternative model would claim that 
ment. Formally, if the weights differ as a function of These terms do not necessarily coincide because the valence, then the observed rank-ordering of difference former and latter formulas reduce to M[f(i)/f(p) 0 1] judgments over infinite option pairs must violate OI. and M[1 0 f(p)/f(i)], respectively. In gist, these alterMoreover, the findings so far allow for specific predicnative arguments claim that positive and negative vations regarding the condition under which OI would lence effects differ in the integration of psychological not hold. In the example above, assume further that values for the preferred and the less preferred options.
Options i and p pertain to gains, whereas Options j and For instance, the latter argument suggests that posiq pertain to losses. After Experiments 1 and 2, it could tive valence effects reflect the sensitivity to the value be expected that a positive valence effect would be obincrement of the preferred option over the less preserved between Options i and p, and a negative valence ferred option, whereas negative valence effects reflect effect would be observed between Options j and q. Thus, the sensitivity to decrement of the less preferred option from the preferred option. Ordinal are pairs j and p. In such comparisons, Experiments 1 independence (hereafter referred to as OI) is the followand 2 showed that it tended to hold that ing relation among pairs of choice options:
For instance, recall the results in Table 1 . For each row in Table 1 , this relationship holds if the mean superiorIn words, OI requires that the superiority and inferiority judgments be order-preservative. Therefore, the ity rating in the gain condition equals to the mean inferiority rating in the loss condition; and if the mean rank-ordering relationship among pairs of options in inferiority rating in the gain condition equals to the mean superiority rating in the loss condition. Empiri-
The Stimulus Configuration of Gamble Pairs in Experiment 3
cally, this idea can be tested as a 2 by 2 crossover interaction between domain (gains or losses) and vaSet ZЉ gambles lence (superiority or inferiority) for each gamble pair. For Pairs 1 through 4 in Experiment 1, such interaction Gain Loss terms were highly significant (F(1,185) Å 39.99***, 0 p q r 23.96***, 24.24***, 22.75*** for Pairs 1 through 4, respectively (using Bonferroni correction for 4 tests).
Now one can see how positive and negative valence Set AЉ
effects may jointly produce violations of OI. Formulas gambles
(20) and (21) in combination produce the following prediction:
Note. †Indicates pairs wherein the ZЉ option dominates the AЉ option. ( j, q) . (22) p were exclusively winning and Gambles q and r were Formulas (22) go contrary to Formulas (19), hence vio-exclusively losing. Each element in Set AЉ has a counlate OI. Formulas (22) specify the following condition: terpart in Set ZЉ that is created by reversing the sign OI is expected to be violated by intra-valence compari-of the payoff, and vice versa for each element in Set ZЉ sons of option pairs, one pair of which produces a posi-having its counterpart in Set AЉ. Table 4 shows the tive valence effect in the domain of gains, whereas the configurations of these gamble pairs.
other pair produces a negative valence effect in the do-
The use of the double quotation in labeling the sets main of losses.
reflects the following ideas: The double quotation indiThe right panel in Fig. 6 shows a hypothetical result cates that these sets contain different gambles from that follows from a violation of OI. As in the left panel, those used in the previous experiments. More imporassume that choice options are rank-ordered by the tantly, although Set AЉ gambles tend to dominate Set superiority ratings. The square symbols show that, as ZЉ gambles, such a relationship does not hold for every the superiority rating increases from the [ j q] pair to possible gamble pair between Sets AЉ and ZЉ. For inthe [i p] pair, the corresponding inferiority rating de-stance, given a [ j o] pair, one would prefer Gamble o creases. The deviation from monotonicity shown in the to Gamble j. inferiority ratings indicate that OI was violated. As
In Experiment 2, it was necessary that each gamble an empirical issue, testing for OI requires testing the in Set A was preferred to each gamble in Set Z, and that significance among violations of monotonicity. Such vi-each gamble in Set A was preferred to each gamble in olations need to be detected among superiority ratings Set Z. If some participants occasionally preferred a Set when choice options are rank-ordered by inferiority rat-Z gamble, then in such a trial the definition of Sets ings, and among inferiority ratings when the same op-A and Z as determined by preferential ordering must tions are rank-ordered by superiority ratings. Experi-change. Therefore, for such trials, the values of f(A good ) ment 3 was designed to conduct such analysis.
and f(Z good ) or f(A bad ) and f(Z bad ) in regression analysis must change. To avoid this, the gambles in Experiment Method 2 were designed so that the preference should be clear from the payoff. Participants. Participants were 438 University of In Experiment 3, however, the critical comparisons Washington undergraduates. They were enrolled in an involve a subset of option pairs from Set AЉ and ZЉ, introductory psychology course and participated to wherein the paired gambles consist of either excluearn extra credit.
sively winning or exclusively losing payoffs. These critical comparisons appear in the diagonal cells in Table  Stimuli . Hypothetical gambles were used as choice options. Sixteen option pairs were generated by having 4. Although it is possible to detect valence effects with other option pairs, such as [ j o] (where the AЉ option 4 gambles in one set and 4 in another set, and making all possible pairs between the two sets. I refer to one is dominated by the ZЉ option), such results would bear few theoretical implications. Nonetheless, data were set as Set AЉ and the other as Set ZЉ. Consult Appendix C for the gambles. Set AЉ consisted of gambles {h, i, j, gathered for such stimulus configurations, because these data contribute to variance estimation in ANOVA k}, wherein Gambles h and i were exclusively winning and Gambles j and k were exclusively losing. Set ZЉ with greater reliability (i.e., they supply extra degrees of freedom in calculating MS e ). consisted of gambles {o, p, q, r}, wherein Gambles o and maining eight gamble pairs, no prediction concerning valence effects is drawn from the foregoing argument. a positive valence effect, this result did not reach statisRegarding OI, the following was predicted: If the fotical significance. Thus, in replication of Experiments cus shift model is in effect when positive and negative 1 and 2, Experiment 3 showed that positive valence valence effects are observed, then systematic violations effects were observed in the domain of gains, whereas of OI as illustrated in the inequalities Formulas (22) negative valence effects were observed in the domain would be observed. Contrarily, if alternative models of losses. are in effect in producing valence effects, superiority and inferiority ratings would adhere to OI.
Testing for OI. As discussed previously, testing whether OI is violated requires an examination of pair Material and procedure. Consult Appendix C for of gamble pairs, with one of the pairs pertaining to stimuli. Each configuration of stimulus pair was pre-gains and the other pertaining to losses. The diagonal sented to participants, after three practice trials that cells in Table 4 show four pairs that pertained excluused similar hypothetical two-outcome gambles. These sively to gains and four that pertained exclusively to choice tasks were arranged in one page of a question-losses. Thus, OI can be tested with respect to the 4 1 naire, and were distributed to participants along with 4 Å 16 pairs of option pairs. The criterion that qualifies other filler tasks. Data were gathered in a group set-as a violation of OI is illustrated by using the pair of ting. For each gamble pair, participants were first [i p] and [ j q]. Assuming Formulas (22), it would follow asked to express their preferences. Subsequently, each that D s (i, p) ú D s ( j, q) and D i (i, p) õ D i ( j, q) must participant provided a superiority rating and an inferi-simultaneously hold with statistical significance to ority rating for each pair. The orders of providing supe-claim an OI violation. The criterion should be applied riority and inferiority ratings were randomized and for the remaining 15 pairs of option pairs. Hence, for counterbalanced across participants.
the statistical tests using planned comparisons (explained later), a Bonferroni correction for the Type I Results and Discussion error rate was used for 16 (pairs) 1 2 (superiority and inferiority ratings) comparisons. Valence effects. For each gamble pair that pertained to gains, the top half in Table 5 shows the mean superi-
The top and bottom panels of Fig. 7 show the mean superiority and inferiority ratings for all the option ority rating, mean inferiority rating, t-values, and the number of participants assigned to the pair. Each pairs used in Experiment 3. The option pairs in the top panel are rank-ordered by the mean superiority paired t-test was performed with a Bonferroni correction for four gamble pairs. As predicted, all the gambles ratings, whereas the option pairs in the bottom panel are rank-ordered by the mean inferiority ratings. For showed significantly positive valence effects.
The bottom half in Table 5 shows the mean superior-the superiority and inferiority ratings, a one-way AN-OVA was performed among the 16 cells to calculate ity rating, mean inferiority rating, t values, and the number of participants for each gamble pair that per-MS e . The omnibus F statistic and MS e were F (15, 423) Å 8.94*** and 10.03 for the superiority ratings, respectained to losses. Each paired t test was performed with a Bonferroni correction for four gamble pairs. Consis-tively. The omnibus F statistic and MS e were F (15, 423) Å 10.28*** and 13.48 for the inferiority ratings, respectent with the prediction, all the significant valence effects were negative. Although the [k q] pair produced tively.
explanations to the focus shift model because such accounts require that valence effects occur without violating OI.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This paper extended the line of research set forth by Yamagishi and Miyamoto (1996) in the following sense. Experiment 1 systematically replicated the finding that positive valence effects were observed in the domain of gains, whereas negative valence effects were observed in the domain of losses. Experiment 2 showed that such positive and negative valence effects were associated with systematic focus shift, namely heavy weighting of A good in superiority judgment and heavy weighting of Z bad in inferiority judgment. Such a pattern was consistent with the description of valence effects by the focus shift model (Formulas (5) and (6)). Experiment 3 showed that data that exhibited positive and negative valence effects were more in agreement with the focus shift model than with other alternative plausible explanations. ship with some descriptive models of preferential choice. Particularly, Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic's (1988) ( j, q) . Of 16 pairs of option pairs, 11 showed a significant difference (a õ .05) between superiority and probability. Reversal of preferential orders between choice and bidding occurs because payoffs are ratings and a significant difference (a õ .05) between inferiority ratings, hence violating OI. Each pair of weighted more heavily in bidding than in choice (Tversky, Slovic, & Kahneman, 1990) . Similarly, Shafir's them is assigned a number, and connected by an arc in the top and bottom panels of Fig. 7 (e.g., the [i p] model of the aforementioned choice-rejection asymmetry posits the following subjective weighting process: and [ j q] pair is assigned a number ''9''). It is noteworthy that, of 5 pairs of option pairs that did not produce The choice option consisting of extremely desirable and extremely undesirable features are both chosen and the predicted violations of OI, 4 involved the [k q] pair (no arc is connected to the [k q] pair in Fig. 7) . Looking rejected because desirable features are weighted heavily in choice, whereas undesirable features are back at Table 5 , this is the only gamble pair that failed to produce the predicted negative valence effect. Fur-weighted heavily in rejection. The consequence is that decision makers are provided with reasons to choose thermore, the condition in Formulas (22) assume Formulas (20), i.e., a positive and a negative valence effect the option with extremely desirable features and with reasons to reject the one with extremely undesirable are a prerequisite condition to predict a violation of OI. Therefore the failure of the [k q] pair in detecting features. It is noteworthy that the formal resemblance among these three models actualized by no coincidence. violations of OI is consistent with the condition in Formulas (22).
They are all inspired by Tversky's (1977) feature-contrast model of asymmetric similarity judgment. Thus, it may be claimed that Experiment 3 showed that OI was violated contingent upon the occurrence of Even in the absence of formalized models, the idea of feature-set representation and subjective weighting significant positive and negative valence effects (that would supposedly occur with the focus shift: see Experi-has been successfully applied to describe asymmetric psychological phenomena. The Dunning-Parpal asymment 2). This result would go against the alternative metry and Dhar and Simonson's (1992) application to 1993). ''According to this principle, the weight of any input component is enhanced by its compatibility with consumer choice were already introduced. In addition, the output. The rationale for this principle is that the Houston, Sherman, and Baker (1989) analyzed the efcharacteristics of the task and the response scale prime fects of stimulus presentation on preferential choice, the most compatible features of the stimulus.'' (Tverand their data were explained by differential weighting sky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988, p. 376 Houston et al. hypothesized line of argument and showed that strength of preferthat the unique features of the subject receive greater ence ratings were in agreement with the compatibility weight than the unique features of the target. Thereprinciple. Back to the current findings, it may seem fore, if the unique features of both the subject and the that the compatibility principle underlies the weighing target are desirable, then B should be preferred to Y.
patterns that are associated with positive and negative If the unique features of both the subject and the target valence effects. Concretely, Figure 5 shows that a s ú are undesirable, then Y should be preferred to B. These a i and h s õ h i ; thus, desirable features were weighted predictions were supported in experiments using stimmore heavily in superiority judgments, whereas undeuli from a variety of domains. sirable features were weighted more heavily in inferiorThe focus shift model clearly demarcates desirable ity judgments. Moreover, Fig. 4 shows that, in the doand undesirable feature sets, and this approach has main of gains, the focus shift model for superiority its roots in Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) Prospect judgment produced better fits than the model for inferiTheory. The distinction between gains and losses in ority judgment (compare Formulas (7) and (8)). Conpreference under risk is a key component of Prospect versely, in the domain of losses, the model for inferiorTheory, and this idea is highly analogous to the segre-ity judgment produced better fits than the model for gation between desirable and undesirable features. superiority judgment (compare Formulas (9) and (10)). Moreover, the current experiments showed that the di-However, caution must be taken before claiming that rection of valence effects was predictable from the in-the compatibility principle explains valence effects, betrinsic pleasantness (gains or losses) of the choice do-cause previous findings (Yamagishi & Miyamoto, 1996) main. One might find an analogy between these find-documented the weighting pattern for positive and negings and Kahneman and Tversky's demonstration that ative valence effects that are not predicted by the comdecision makers switch their attitudes from risk averse patibility principle. Looking back at Fig. 2 , their findto risk seeking between gains and losses. It should be ings indicate that a s ú a i and h s ú h i when positive remarked however, that the analogy between the focus valence effects were observed. The compatibility princishift model and Prospect Theory would not lead to a ple has difficulty to predict the h s ú h i part, namely competition wherein the two models provide different heavy weighting of undesirable features in superiority predictions. The reason is that Prospect Theory is a judgment. Likewise, Yamagishi and Miyamoto noted theory of preference, whereas the focus shift model pos-that a s õ a i and h s õ h i when negative valence effects tulates how strength of preference is formed after a were observed. Again, the h s õ h i part is not explained clear preferential ordering is established.
by the compatibility principle. It is not attempted here Finally, discrepancies from a general principle that to claim a boundary condition beyond which the comis said to direct changes of subjective weights are re-patibility principle fails to apply. Rather, I am remarked. As a governing principle, various theorists marking that more research is needed to elaborate the adopted the notion of ''compatibility principle'' (e.g., details of psychological mechanisms that produce a va- Tversky et al., 1988; Fisher & Hawkins, 1993 ; Shafir, riety of asymmetric phenomena. 
